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Abstract

This paper examines some of the major economic and institutional factors underlying the surge
in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Chile during the more recent 1990-2014 period. It
reports econometric results which suggest that standard economic variables and major changes
in the institutional-legal status of foreign capital are, in large measure, responsible for the rapid
increase in net FDI inflows to leading sectors of the Chilean economy. Cointegration analysis
and error-correction modeling suggest that market size, the real exchange rate, the debt-service
ratio, education, physical infrastructure, and the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom index are
economically significant in explaining the variation in net FDI inflows to the country. Dummy
variables, designed to capture qualitative factors such as the impact of economic crises and
institutional reforms, are also included and they have their anticipated signs and are statistically
significant. The paper also addresses the long-term negative effects of rapidly growing profit
and dividend remittances on the financing of capital formation and the Chilean balance of
payments in recent years.
J.E.L. Codes: C22, O10, O40, O57.
Keywords: Chilean economy; cointegration analysis; error correction model; Gross Capital
Formation; FDI flows; Granger causality test; Johansen and Juselius test; remittances of profits
and dividends; Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC); Theil inequality coefficient; unit roots.
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I. Introduction
Beginning in the decade of the 1990s and continuing into the first two decades of the 21st
century, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows undertaken by transnational corporations
(TNCs) have become one of the leading factors in promoting the process of economic
globalization. Between 1990 and 1996 these flows averaged $254.3 billion on an annual basis,
while during the 1997-2014 period they averaged a staggering $1,130 billion, or practically
four and half time as much [see UNCTAD, 2003; and 2016]. The acceleration in FDI inflows
during the 1990s and early 2000s was notable because an increasing proportion of these funds
were directed to the developing nations, including the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean. From a relative standpoint, Latin America’s share of FDI inflows to developing
countries rose from 29 percent in 1995 to an-all time high of 39.5 percent in 2000, before
falling to 28.3 percent during the recession year of 2009, and then rebounding, respectively,
to 30.5 and 33.7 percent in 2010 and 2011-12. The region’s share fell again to 26.7 percent in
2013-14 following a significant decline in cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Central
America, lower commodity prices which reduced investment in extractive industries,
particularly in South America, and the completion of major privatizations in industry, banking,
and mining (see UNCTAD, 2015, pp. 58-62).
The increase in net FDI flows channeled to these countries, particularly Chile, has been
nothing short of spectacular when you factor in the relatively small size of Chile’s economy.
Between 1990 and 1996 Chile averaged net FDI inflows of $1.2 billion, while during the
1996-2014 period it raised its average more than fourfold to $5.5 billion (ECLAC, 2016,
Table A1.10, p. 97; and UNCTAD, 2015). During the latter period, Chile’s average ranked
only behind Brazil ($33.6 billion), Mexico ($15.3 billion), and Argentina ($6.8 billion)Bmuch
larger economies Bin its ability to attract net FDI inflows (ECLAC, 2007; 2016, Table A1.10,
p. 97). The extant literature contends that, in large part, this has been due to Chile=s relatively
successful adoption and implementation of macroeconomic stabilization measures and
market-based structural reform programs. The former have insured high and sustained rates
of economic growth with relatively low inflation rates since 1985, while the latter have taken
the form of privatization and debt conversion programs, the liberalization of the tradeable
sector, and the removal of overly restrictive FDI legislation concerning the repatriation of
profits as well as local content and export requirements. The adoption of these fiscally
prudent and structural reform policies has reassured both foreign and domestic investors in
the country’s commitment to market-based, outward-oriented reforms (see Armendariz and
Larrain, 2017, pp. 246-252; Edwards, 1999; Edwards and Lederman, 2002; and Irwin, 2015).
However, critics of the neoliberal model contend that the rapid and far-reaching liberalization
of the tradeable sector was undertaken with little or no regard to its negative impact on
domestic industry, employment, and the environment; moreover, they contend that the
removal of restrictions on the remittances of profits and dividends has generated in recent
years a growing reverse flow to parent companies which has become a significant constraint
on the balance of payments (see Chang, 2008; Cypher, 2014, pp. 527-572; Ffrench-Davis,
1999; Green, 2013; and Weisbrot, 2015). Only time will tell if these reforms are sustainable
in the long run, particularly in the wake of recent economic and financial crises that have
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buffeted the region. What is indisputable, however, is that FDI flows will not only play a
strategic role in modernizing Chile’s Band Latin America’s-- economy, but in providing future
income and employment opportunities.
In view of the above, this paper analyzes the recent evolution, rationale, and major economic
and institutional determinants of FDI flows to Chile. Chile was one of the earliest countries in
the region to adopt and implement market-based reforms, albeit at great social and political
cost. The process of economic and financial liberalization began following the brutal military
coup of 1973 and, in recent years, Chile has further liberalized its FDI regime by modifying
Decree Law 600 and its debt capitalization mechanism (Chapter XIX of the Central Bank’s
Compensation of International Exchange Regulations). FDI flows in the Chilean case have,
historically, been channeled to traditional sectors such as mining and energy sectors. However,
with the return of democracy during the nineties, a significant proportion of these funds have
been channeled to export-oriented manufacturing operations or to non-traditional sectors such
as renewable energy (wind farms) and industrial machinery using innovative technological
processes and managerial techniques (see Alatorre and Razo, 2010). An analysis of the
evolution and determinants of FDI flows to Chile during the decade of the nineties and
beyond should uncover important trends and provide valuable policy insights to government
officials seeking to attract these flows to the country.
The layout of the paper is as follows: First, it reviews the extant literature on the major
economic and institutional determinants of FDI. Second, the paper gives an overview of net
FDI flows to Chile in terms of their absolute magnitude and relative contribution to the
financing of private capital formation. Third, the paper presents cointegration and
error-correction model results that identify some of the major economic and institutional
determinants of FDI flows to Chile during the 1960-2014 period. The concluding section
summarizes the major arguments and offers some policy prescriptions for attracting FDI into
the region and enhancing its positive direct and indirect effects.

2. Conceptual Framework
From a theoretical standpoint, John Dunning (1981; 1988) has developed one of the most
comprehensive explanations of why TNC firms undertake cross-border investments. He
argues that TNCs invest abroad when three sets of relative advantages are present. First, the
establishment of TNC subsidiaries gives the parent firms exclusive ownership rights over
patents, trademarks, commercial secrets and production processes, thereby effectively
denying access to both foreign and domestic competitors. Second, they generate for TNC
affiliates locational advantages that arise from direct access to growing markets and lower
unit labor costs, reduced transportation and communication costs, avoidance of tariffs and
non-tariff barriers, and last but not least, direct access to raw materials, low-cost unskilled
labor, and intermediate products that are indispensable for the production of certain goods.
Michael Mortimore (2003), building on Dunning’s work, argues that the relative importance
of location specific determinants depends on TNC motivations for investing, viz., whether
FDI is motivated by market-seeking (access to internal and export markets), natural
3
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resource-seeking (access to natural resources and low-cost labor) or efficiency-seeking
reasons (cost and quality of human resources and physical infrastructure resources).
Third, Dunning points to the advantages TNCs derive from internalizing certain operations
because utilizing market mechanisms are relatively more burdensome and costly. For instance,
many TNCs would rather establish a subsidiary abroad and assume directly the contractual
and administrative costs associated with research, development, production, and marketing of
a given product or service, thereby avoiding the transaction costs associated with leasing
licenses and securing patents to undertake production or hiring the services of advertizing
agencies to market and distribute their products. In this connection, Markusen (1995) argues
that firms choose direct investment rather than licensing primarily because of the
non-excludability property of new knowledge capital; viz., it is too costly for TNCs to prevent
licensees from Adefecting and copying the new technology at little cost and setting up their
own domestic firms in direct competition with the TNCs (p. 182).
Host country determinants also seem to play a very important role in either attracting or
discouraging FDI flows to developing countries. For example, countries that exhibit a greater
degree of political and macroeconomic stability, the existence of well-defined and
enforceable property rights when it comes to the transfer of technology, liberal legislation
governing the remittance of profits and dividends, and limited or non-existent local content or
export requirements tend, on average, to attract greater flows of FDI. However, from the
standpoint of the host country, the very factors which act as an incentive for FDI flows in the
short run may prove detrimental to long-term economic development if they lead to a net
outflow of resources, few backward and forward linkages, and limited transfers of technology
and managerial knowhow (see Blomstrom and Persson, 1983; Cypher, 2014; and Yeager,
1998).
The nature and scope of government policies are also a highly important factor in
determining whether FDI flows to developing economies such as Chile. For example, FDI is
likely to be attracted to countries where governments ensure an adequate provision of
economic and social infrastructure in the form of paved roads, ports, airfields, relatively
cheap energy supplies, and a well-educated and disciplined work force. In this connection,
several investigators have found that the availability of skilled workers and adequate physical
infrastructure are important determinants of FDI flows because it enables TNCs to strengthen
both their ownership and locational advantages, thus allowing them to expand their market
not only in the host country but the region as well (see Cypher, 2014; Ramasamy and Young,
2004). In addition, FDI flows are likely to be encouraged by government policies that lead to
the establishment of a legal-institutional framework that is conducive to business activity; viz.,
one that significantly reduces the transactions costs associated with negotiating contracts,
improves information about the quality of goods and services, and make sure that the parties
to a formal agreement honor their commitments (see Yeager,1999).
Finally, changes in a country’s exchange rate policy play a key role in altering its relative
attractiveness to net FDI inflows. Not surprisingly, economists are not entirely of one mind
when it comes to the optimal exchange rate strategy to pursue. For example, some
4
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investigators argue that a policy that keeps the real exchange rate undervalued relative to that
of its key investment partners is, ceteris paribus, likely to enhance FDI flows because it
artificially reduces the unit costs of the country’s factors of production and thus enables
investors to make a significantly larger investment in terms of the domestic currency. They
also contend that it enhances the profitability of the export-oriented sector which, in turn,
attracts FDI flows to them. Therefore, the amount of FDI should increase with a real
devaluation of the domestic currency after a reasonable lag (see ECLAC, 1998; De Vita and
Lawler, 2004).
Other researchers contend that a policy that leads to a real appreciation of the domestic
currency is likely to encourage FDI inflows because it enhances the foreign currency (dollar)
value of the remittances of profits and dividends back to the parent company (see Cypher,
2014; De Mello, Jr., 1997; and De Vita and Lawler, 2004). After all, it is the real rate of return
on their initial (dollar) investment that matters to the parent company. In light of the
conflicting views in the literature on the impact of the exchange rate on FDI flows, it is best,
from a policy standpoint, to pursue a credible strategy that maintains the country’s real
exchange rate in line with that of its key trading and investment partners.

3. FDI Flows to Chile
The lost decade of the 1980s led to an absolute decrease in net FDI inflows to Latin America
and the Caribbean during the first half of the 1980s, after which they began to increase
steadily during the second half of the 1980s and posted a dramatic upward surge during the
decades of the 1990s and 2000s. Net FDI flows to the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean rose dramatically from $8.4 billion in 1990 to $77.2 billion in 2000 and almost
100 billion in 2008, before falling precipitously to $72.2 billion in 2009 as a direct result of
the adverse effects of the U.S. Great Recession of 2007-09 (see UNCTAD, 2015). However,
in the wake of the dramatic commodity-induced economic recovery experienced by South
America (particularly, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru) during the 2010-12 period, these
net flows are estimated to have risen sharply to $153.5 billion in 2011 and $149 billion in
2012 (see ECLAC, 2016; and UNCTAD, 2016).
The strength and resilience of FDI flows is revealed by the fact that despite the serious
economic and financial crises that have buffeted the region, including the ATequila crisis of
1994-95, the 1997-98 Asian crisis, the Argentinean economic collapse of 2001-02, and the
U.S.’s Great Recession, they have, time and again, managed to stage a remarkable recovery,
particularly after 2002. In absolute terms, the major recipients of FDI flows have been
concentrated in a few major countries of the region, in order of importance of the cumulative
level of net inflows during the 2000-2012 period, they are Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina,
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. The major supplier of FDI flows to Latin America during the
decades of the 1990s and 2000s (and historically) has been the United States followed, in
order of importance, by Great Britain, Japan, China, Germany, and France (see ECLAC,
2016).
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In relative terms, Figure 1 below shows net FDI flows as a percentage of GDP for Chile and
Mexico during the 2002-2014 period. The figure reveals that during the decade of the 2000s
and beyond, both Chile and Mexico exhibited a strong record of attracting net FDI inflows,
and with the exception of 2012 for Mexico, never falling below 1.0 percent of their countries'
respective GDPs. More remarkably, in the case of Chile there is only one year when the ratio
falls below 2 percent, viz., 2010; in fact, for the entire 13-year period, FDI inflows averaged a
remarkable 3.7 percent for Chile, and a respectable 1.8 percent in the case of Mexico. FDI
flows in the case of Chile have been primarily, but not exclusively, attracted to extractive and
natural resource-based industries such as mining, fishing, and agriculture, while in the case of
Mexico, the manufacturing and financial services sectors have been the major destinations of
these flows.

Figure 1. Net FDI Flows as a Percentage of GDP, 2002-2014
Source: ECLAC (2016).

The importance of these net inflows is more fully appreciated by focusing on their evolution
relative to these countries’ gross fixed capital formation, since they are viewed as a source of
investable resources to the host nation. Figure 2 below shows that throughout the decade of
the 2000s, and particularly after 2003, FDI flows represented more than 15 percent of Latin
America’s gross fixed capital formation (GFCF); and in the case of Chile, these flows
averaged more than a quarter of gross fixed capital formation during the 2003-2011
period--the highest figure among the major countries of the region, or for that matter, the
developing world.(Note 1)
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Figure 2. Net FDI Flows as a Percentage of GFCF, 2002-2014
Source: ECLAC (2016).

Critics of FDI , however, contend that instead of increasing the investable resources of the
host nation, FDI flows divert resources away from capital formation because they generate a
substantial reverse flows in the form of remittances of profits and interest to the parent
companies, as well as through the widespread practice of intra-firm transfer pricing (see
Chang, 2008; Cypher and Dietz, 2003; Cypher, 2014; Figueroa, 1998; Plasschaert, 1994; and
Ram and Zhang, 2002). In their view, in order to assess the net contribution of FDI to the
financing of private capital formation, one must first deduct from gross FDI inflows the
repatriation of profits and interest to the parent companies, often residing in the U.S. for
many of the countries in question.
Partial support for this contention can be surmised from the following figures: profit and
interest remittances by Latin America and the Caribbean to the developed countries more
than quadrupled between 2004 and 2012, from $33.6 billion to $158 billion (see ECLAC,
2012, Table 2.2.1.1, p. 97; and ECLAC, 2016, Table A1.1, p. 88). To put these figures in
perspective, in 2004 and 2012, net FDI inflows to the region were respectively $50.8 and
$148.5 billion; that is, reverse outflows in the form of profits and interest from Latin America
and the Caribbean to the developed countries grew from an already high 66 percent of net
FDI inflows in 2004 to over 100 percent (106.4 to be exact) in 2012! That is, during the year
2012 the outflow of resources (in the form of profits and interest) from the region exceeded
7
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the inflow in the form of net FDI by practically $10 billion. Insofar as Chile is concerned,
given its highly liberal policies towards the repatriation of profits, it experienced a large
outflow of net profits during the decade of the 2000s and beyond; Figure 3 below reveals that
for the 2002-2014 period, the repatriation of net profits on FDI rose from $2.1 billion in 2002
to $10.3 billion in 2005 and a staggering $20 billion in 2007, and thereafter fell to $11 and
$8.8 billion in 2013 and 2014, respectively. To put these figures in perspective, the outflow of
net profits in 2014 alone represented 41.3 percent of the gross inflows of FDI into the country
that year, and almost as much as the net inflow of FDI which stood at $9.4 billion (ECLAC,
2016, p. 97; and UNCTAD, 2016)! In fact, relative to the country’s gross inflows of FDI,
Chile’s repatriation of net profits on FDI during the 2002-2014 period averaged 77 percent
(computed from ECLAC, 2015; and UNCTAD, 2016). If we were to subtract these profits
from gross FDI inflows on a yearly basis, and then express the figure as a proportion of fixed
capital formation, it would be evident that the net contribution of FDI to the financing of
gross fixed capital formation in Chile, although increasing in recent years, would be far less
than that advertised by the unadjusted figures in Figure 2 above.

Figure 3. Chile: Net Profits on FDI ($ bn)
Source: ECLAC (2016); and UNCTAD (2016).

Economic theory, however, suggests that rather than focus on the flows of FDI to the
countries of Latin America, it is theoretically more appropriate to concentrate on the
accumulated stock of FDI, because increases in the latter raise the host country’s marginal
productivity of private capital (and labor), a process that eventually translates into higher
8
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levels of output, employment creation, and potential tax revenues [see Bosworth and Collins,
1999]. The stock of FDI in Latin America (1990 dollars) rose from $175.6 billion in 1990 to
$355.4 billion in 2000, and an impressive $1,146.6 billion in 2010 (see ECLAC, 2007; and
UNCTAD, 2016, Annex Table 2). Just between 2000 and 2010, Latin America’s stock of FDI
more than tripled—a cumulative increase which is greater than that of the entire Alost decade
of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s! In this connection, Chile’s performance mirrored
and excelled that of the region, in view of the relatively small size of its economy compared
to Brazil and Mexico—the major recipients of FDI flows in the region. Chile’s stock of net
FDI rose from $34.5 billion in 2000 to a level of $103.4 billion in 2010, or about three times
(obtained from UNCTAD, 2016, Annex Table 2). From a relative standpoint, the rise of
Chile’s stock of inward FDI is even more impressive, increasing from 58.8 percent of GDP in
2000 to 72 percent of GDP in 2010--by far, the highest share of any major country of the
region, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela (see ECLAC,
2007; and UNCTAD, 2016). In addition to the direct effects associated with a greater stock of
FDI, several investigators argue that there are indirect positive spillover effects on overall
efficiency that arise from enhanced competition generated by foreign firms, the transfer of
needed technology and managerial knowhow to local firms, and trade-induced
learning-by-doing effects as local firms attempt to overcome competition in the global market
(see Armedariz and Larrain, 2017; Cypher, 2014; De Mello Jr., 1997; Ram & Zhang, 2002;
and Vadlamannati and Tamazian, 2009).

4. Empirical Model and Results
Historically, empirical work on the determinants of FDI flows to Latin America and the
Caribbean have been relatively few given the paucity and inconsistency of the data, as well as
the economic and institutional heterogeneity present in these countries. However, in recent
years, a number of studies focusing on the determinants (and impact) of FDI flows to several
countries of the region have arisen as a result of the renewed surge in net flows to these
countries beginning in the second half of the 1980s and the availability of reliable and
methodologically consistent time series data for a number of countries (see Armedariz and
Larrain, 2017; Agosin, 1995 and 1999; Bloomstrom and Wolff, 1994; DeMello, Jr., 1997;
ECLAC, 1998 and 2000; Figueroa, 1998; Ramasamy and Yeung, 2004; Ramirez, 2000; Ros,
1994; and Zhang, 2001).
4.1 Model
Following the lead of Agosin (1995), (Ramasamy and Yeung, 2004), Ros (1994) and Zhang
(2001), this study estimated a foreign direct investment (FDI) function of the following
general form:
FDI t = f(GDPt-i, REXt-i, DSt-i , SEDt-i , PAVEDt-i ; EFIt-i , Di) + εt

(1)

It includes standard arguments such as real GDP, the real exchange rate (REX), the ratio of
debt service payments to exports of goods and services (DS), the number of students enrolled
in secondary education (SED) as a proxy for human capital, the total kilometers or the
9
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percentage of paved roads as a proxy for physical infrastructure, the economic freedom index
(EFI) generated by the Fraser Institute, and dummy variables (Di) to explain the variation in
FDI flows to Chile during the 1960-2014 period. (Note 2) εt is a normally distributed error
term.
Chile’s potential market size is proxied by the lagged value of real GDP because foreign
investors make their investment decisions based on expectations generated, in part, by what
the level of real GDP was in the preceding year. The sign associated with this variable is
expected to be positive. Market size was also proxied by the value of real exports (X) in view
of the growing importance of external markets for the Chilean economy since 1987 (results
available upon request). For example, the data indicate that after 1987 a significant share of
the country’s GDP (at least 25 percent) has been destined for export markets in the high
income OECD (Europe, U.S. and Japan) countries and China (see OECD, 2003, Table A.1).
The real exchange rate is included in the model because it is the most important link between
economic policy and international competitiveness and, as explained in Section II, it is
expected to have an indeterminate sign in the Chilean case. (Note 3) On the one hand, a
considerable proportion of FDI flows to Chile, in recent years, are concentrated in foreign
affiliates which have a strong export orientation, such as cellulose and paper,
telecommunications, and manufacturing. A ceteris paribus real depreciation of the domestic
currency (a rise in REX) should increase the profitability of these sectors and, ceteris paribus,
induce FDI flows to them. On the other hand, a real depreciation of the domestic currency
reduces the (dollar) value of the remittances of profits and dividends back to the parent
company, thereby reducing the real rate of return on the parent company’s initial (dollar)
investment. According to this rationale, a ceteris paribus depreciation of the domestic
currency should reduce FDI flows to the country. This variable is introduced with a lag
because the decision to invest in new plant, machinery, and equipment in a foreign country
takes time due to recognition, implementation, and institutional-legal delays.
The debt service payments- to- exports ratio, was included to measure country risk; viz., the
higher the ratio, the greater the probability that a BOP crisis will emerge which may lead to
the imposition of restrictions on profit and dividend remittances, thereby depressing FDI
flows to the country. This variable is also designed to capture the influence of external factors
on the Chilean economy, such as the increase in the cost of credit and/or demand for the
country’s exports. It is anticipated to have a negative and statistically significant effect on
inward FDI flows.
The final quantitative variables, the number of students enrolled in secondary education
(thousands) and the kilometers of paved roads (hundreds), were included, respectively, as
crude proxies for the quality of the country’s human and physical capital. Insofar as the
education variable is concerned, it would have been preferable to have used the secondary
enrollment ratio, but this variable was not available for the entire period. In the case of the
physical infrastructure variable, the percentage of paved roads was also utilized and, as
reported below, the results were not significantly different. The rationale for including these
variables is relatively straightforward. For example, it is hypothesized that, ceteris paribus,
10
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the higher the level of education in the country, the more attractive it is to foreign investors
both from a cost standpoint (lower unit labor costs) and a demand-side perspective (greater
purchasing power and more informed consumers). In the case of physical infrastructure, it is
hypothesized that the higher the percentage of paved roads in the country, the more attractive
it is to TNCs because it allows them to move resources and distribute goods at lower cost (see
Ramasamy and Yeung, 2004).
Turning to the qualitative variables, the economic freedom index generated by the Fraser
Institute for Chile was included in the estimation for the 1980-2014 period due to
unavailability of data before 1980. The general idea is that countries with greater economic
freedom have a legal-institutional framework that is more conducive to business activity and
economic growth than countries that adopt policies that restrict “economic freedom.” This
index is a summary measure of a number components of “economic freedom” such as
monetary policy and price stability, the top marginal tax rate, legal structure and property
rights, viability of contracts, and the rule of law. The index has a scale that ranges from 1 to
10, where a score of 10 represents the highest attainable level of economic freedom. (Note 4)
It is anticipated that this variable will have a positive and statistically significant effect on
inward FDI flows to the region. It should be noted that all of the countries in this study report
indices that range between 2 and 8, with Chile and Costa Rica at the high end and Ecuador
and Peru at the low end.
Dummy variable D1 equals 1 for the economic crises years of 1970-1973 (administration of
president Salvador Allende Gossens and 1973 military coup), onset and aftermath of debt
crisis in 1982-83, and the downturn in economic activity induced by the 2008-09 Great
Recession; it is 0 otherwise; this variable is anticipated to have a negative and statistically
significant effect on foreign (and domestic) investment because of the uncertainty generated
for expected returns from political turmoil and depressed economic activity. Again, these
events may induce government officials to adopt a more nationalistic stance and impose
restrictions on foreign investors in terms of the sectoral destination of FDI flows and the
repatriation of profits and dividends. D2 is set equal to 1 for the 1987-97 period (acceleration
of real economic growth associated with the Chilean government’s decision to pursue
vigorously an outward-oriented strategy of economic development beginning in 1986-87. D3
equals 1 for the debt-led growth years of 1978-81. Both D2 and D3 are expected to have
positive and statistically significant coefficients. The model was also estimated with dummy
variable D2 multiplied by real GDP. By estimating this variable interactively with real GDP
one can assess whether the consolidation of market-oriented reforms had a positive and
significant effect on the capacity of market size to affect real FDI flows.
4.2 Data
Economic data (including foreign direct investment) used in this study were obtained from
official government sources such as the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (various issues),
the Banco Central de Chile’s Memoria Anual (various issues) and the Banco’s comprehensive
longitudinal publication entitled, Indicadores Economicos y Sociales, 1960-2001 [see August
2003 Excel edition]; and ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean
11
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(2016). data was also obtained from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015-16. (Note 5)
The FDI stock variable (KDI) in millions of 1977 pesos was generated using a standard
perpetual inventory model. Initial stocks of private foreign capital were estimated by
aggregating over four years of gross investment (1957-1960), assuming an estimate of the
rate of depreciation of 5 percent. (Note 5) GDP is real gross domestic product in millions
1977 pesos. REX is the real exchange rate (1978=100), where an increase represents a real
depreciation of the domestic currency. DS is the ratio of debt-service payments- to- exports of
goods and services variable; debt-service payments include both amortization (gradual
payment of principal) and interest payments on the country’s total external public debt. SED
refers to the number of students matriculated in secondary education, and PAVED is defined
as the total number of paved roads (in kilometers).
4.3 Cointegration Analysis
Unit root tests were undertaken for the variables in question given that it is well-known that
macro time series data tend to exhibit a deterministic and/or stochastic trend that renders
them non-stationary; i.e., the variables have means, variances, and covariances that are not
time invariant (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979). Engle and Granger (1987) have shown that the
direct application of OLS or GLS to non-stationary data produces regressions that are
mispecified or spurious in nature. Table 1 below presents the results of running an
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (one lag) for the log of the variables in both level and
differenced form under the assumption of a stochastic trend. (Note 6) It can be seen that the
variables in level form are non-stationary. In the case of first differences, however, the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity (unit root) can be rejected for the relevant variables at least at
the five percent level.
Table 1. Chile: Unit Root Tests for Stationarity, Sample Period 1960-2014
Variables
LKDI
LGDP
LREX
LX
LDS
LSED
LPAVED
LRPAVED

Levels
-0.13
0.25
-2.43
0.34
-2.24
-1.66
1.66
-2.47

First Difference
-3.15*
-6.52**
-3.52**
-7.20**
-7.98**
-7.85**
-5.07**
-4.51**

5% Critical Valuea
-2.92
-2.92
-2.92
-2.92
-2.92
-2.92
-2.92
-2.92

1% Critical Value
-3.56
-3.56
-3.56
-3.56
-3.56
-3.56
-3.56
-3.56

a

Total number of observations is 55 which exceeds critical threshold of 50. Mackinnon critical values
for rejection of null hypothesis of a unit root under the assumption of a stochastic trend.*Denotes
significance at the 5 percent level; **denotes significance at the 1 percent level. Estimations
undertaken with Eviews 9.5.

In view of the above, it is necessary to determine whether there is at least one linear
combination of these non-stationary variables (in level form) that is I(0). In words, does there
exist a stable and non-spurious (cointegrated) relationship among the relevant variables over
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the period in question? The Johansen and Juselius (1990) test was used to determine whether
there is a stable long-run relationship among the relevant variables in logarithmic form, viz.,
the natural log of the stock of FDI (LKDI), the log of real GDP ( LGDP), the log of the debt
service-to-GDP ratio (LDS), the log of the real exchange rate (LREX), the log of the number
of students enrolled in secondary education (LSED), and the log of total paved roads
(LPAVED). Application of the likelihood ratio (L.R.) test showed that the null hypothesis of
no cointegrating relationship can be rejected at the 5 percent level (trace statistic = 72.69 >
critical value = 69.82 (p-value: 0.029); and Max-Eigen statistic= 44.96 > critical value =
40.07 (p-value: 0.013), thereby suggesting that there is at least one unique linear combination
of these non-stationary variables (in level form) that is stationary.
The cointegrating regression (normalized on LKDI) is given below.
Cointegrating Equation:

Log likelihood

333.14

Normalized cointegrating coefficients:
LKDI

LGDP

LREX

LDS

LSED

LPAVED

C

1.000

-1.486

0.083

0.258

-1.98

-0.60

42.72

(0.456)

(0.033)

(0.136)

(0.375)

(0.320)

[t=3.259]

[t=2.520]

[t=1.897]

[t=5.280]

[t=1.890]

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.
The signs are reversed because of the normalization process and they clearly show that, in the
long run, LGDP, LSED, and LPAVED have a positive and significant effect on the stock of
FDI (LKDI), while LREX and LDS have a negative and statistically significant effect. The
relatively high log likelihood statistic suggests that the included variables taken together are
highly significant in explaining the variation in the stock of FDI in the long run. It should be
noted that the null hypothesis of no cointegration was also rejected at the 5 percent level
when the log of real exports (LX) rather than LGDP was used to proxy market size (at least
one cointegrating vector was present) (available upon request).
4.4 Results
The information provided by the L.R. test was also used to generate a set of error correction
(EC) models that capture both the short and long-run behavior of the FDI relationship. For
simplicity, consider below the basic EC model without EFI and the dummy variables:
ΔLKDIt = α

+ β1ΔLGDPt-i + β2 ΔLREXt-i + β3 ΔLDSt-i + β4 ΔLSEDt-i +β5 ΔLPAVEDt-i
+ δECTt-1 + εt

(2)

The coefficients (β=s) of the variables represent short-run percentage growth rates, while the
coefficient, δ (< 0), on the lagged EC term obtained from the cointegrating equation in level
form denotes the speed of adjustment back to the long-run situation in which the variables
grow at the same constant rate. εt refers to the population disturbances which are (each)
assumed to be normally independently distributed. To conserve space, the results of five of
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the EC models estimated in this study are given in Table 2 below. T-ratios are in parenthesis
and one and two asterisks denotes, respectively, statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5
percent (or less) levels.

Table 2. Chile: Error-Correction Models, 1960-2014 (dependent variable = ΔLKDIt )
Variables
Constant

Equation (1)
0.09
(3.78)**
0.30
(2.71)**
----

Equation (2)
0.07
(6.01)**
0.34
(3.03)**
----

----

----

D2

-0.06
(-2.30)**
-0.05
(-2.86)**
0.09
(4.99)**
0.29
(2.11)**
-0.13
(-3.64)**
-0.04
(-3.44)**
----

-0.06
(-3.22)**
-0.07
(-3.95)**
0.07
(3.74)**
0.48
(2.57)**
-0.11
(-3.39)**
-0.06
(-2.54)**
0.12
(3.66)**

D3

----

ΔLGDPt-2
D2*ΔLGDPt-2
EFIt-1
ΔLREXt-1
ΔLDSt-2
ΔLSEDt
ΔLPAVDt-1
ECTt-1
D1

Equation (3)
0.08
(4.03)**
0.39
(5.39)**
0.80
(1.99)**
----0.05
(-2.73)**
-0.06
(-3.83)**
0.08
(5.34)**
0.37
(2.44)**
-0.11
(-3.86)**
-0.06
(-3.32)**
----

Equation (4)
-0.46
(-1.47)*
0.61
(3.25)**
----

Equation (5)
0.09
(3.20)**
0.29
(2.62)**
----

0.05
(1.93)**
-0.11
(-1.70)**
-0.11
(-3. 72)**
0.76
(2.90)**
----

----

-0.26
(-2.86)**
-0.05
(-2.25)**
----

-0.06
(-2.24)**
-0.04
(-2.29)**
0.09
(4.57)**
0.35
(2.24)**
-0.13
(-3.55)**
-------

0.11
0.11
------(7.11)**
(5.07)**
2
Adj.R
0.69
0.80
0.75
0.71
0.65
D.W.
2.01
1.96
1.98
2.06
2.04
F-stat
9.72**
14.06**
10.42**
6.22**
10.0**
AIC.
-2.79
-3.17
-2.94
-2.85
-2.73
SBC
-2.41
-2.72
-2.48
-2.69
-2.39
t-ratios in parenthesis. *Significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level. ECT=
Error-Correction Term; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; SBC Schwartz Bayesian Criterion. N=55
observations, except for eq. (4) where N=35

The EC estimates reported in equations (1)- (5) suggest that a two-year lagged percentage
change in real GDP has a positive effect on FDI flows (growth rate in the stock of FDI) and a
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one-year lagged percentage change in the real exchange rate has a negative effect. For
example, the estimates in eq. (1) suggest that a ceteris paribus 10 percent increase in the
percentage growth rate in real GDP during the current period generates a 3 percent increase in
FDI flows to the country within two years, while a 10 percent rise in the growth rate in the
real exchange rate (a depreciation) during the current period generates a 0.6 percent reduction
in FDI flows in the following year. As anticipated, the ratio of debt service
payments-to-exports variable had a negative and statistically significant effect on FDI flows
when lagged 2 periods, while the education variable had a positive and significant effect. In
the latter case, a 10 percent increase in the growth rate of secondary enrollment during the
current period generates a 0.9 percent increase in FDI flows to the country. Finally, the
relatively high and significant estimate for the physical infrastructure variable suggests that it
is highly important in attracting FDI flows to the country. For example, in eq. (2), an increase
in the percentage growth rate of paved roads by 10 percent generates, on average, a 4.8
percent increase in FDI flows to the country, ceteris paribus(Note 7)From an institutional
standpoint, the results reported in eq. (2) suggest that the debt-led growth of the early 1980s
(D3) and the liberalization of foreign investment rules during the 1987-97 (D2) period had a
positive and statistically significant effect on FDI flows to Chile, while political and
economic turmoil (D1) had a negative and statistically significant impact.
Although the real GDP variable is lagged in the reported EC models, it is possible that FDI
flows may affect real GDP. To test for this possibility I ran a Pairwise Granger Causality Test
with one and two lags. The results show that the null hypothesis that ΔLGDP does not
AGranger cause ΔLKDI could be rejected at the 2 percent level for one lag (p-value: 0.0194)
and at the 6 percent level with two lags (p-value= .0602), while the hypothesis that ΔLKDI
does not AGranger cause ΔLGDP could not be rejected (p-value: 0.1968 for one lag, and for
two lags=0.359). Of course, this test says nothing about Acausation per se; it only provides
information about whether changes in one variable precede changes in another. (Note 8)
The ECM model was also estimated with dummy variable D2 multiplied by the change in the
log of real GDP. By estimating this variable interactively with the change in the log of real
GDP one can assess whether the consolidation of market-oriented reforms had a positive and
significant effect on the capacity of market size to affect real FDI flows. The results are
reported in eq. (3), and they suggest that the reforms enhanced further the positive impact of
market size on FDI flows. Table 3 also reports results for the basic ECM model without the
dummy variables to determine whether the quantitative variables maintain their signs and
significance. As can be seen by eq. (5), the estimates are robust to the exclusion of the
qualitative variables, and the EC term retains a relatively high degree of significance and
explanatory power. Along the same lines, eq. (1) shows that the inclusion of qualitative
variable D1 by itself does not alter the sign nor the significance of the quantitative variables
in the EC model.
Eq. (4) reports estimates that include EFI as the relevant proxy for Chile=s degree of
“economic freedom” or the degree to which the legal-institutional framework of the country
is conducive to business activity. The coefficient for the EFI variable suggests that it is
positive and significant when lagged one period, viz., a 10 percent increase in the index
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during the current period generates a 0.5 percent increase in FDI flows to the country within
one year, ceteris paribus. However, the estimates should be interpreted cautiously because the
sample period had to be shortened to 35 years due to the unavailability of data for the EFI,
and the LPAVED variable was excluded due to the high degree of collinearity with the EFI
variable. (Note 9)
The Bruesch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test (with two lags) indicated that first order
serial correlation was present in the reported EC models, so they were corrected by including
an AR(1) term. The D.W. values for all equations in Table 2 suggest that the null hypothesis
of no (positive) first order autocorrelation cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. The
relative fit and efficiency of the EC models is quite good for eqs. (1)-(3) and, as the theory
predicts, the lagged residual terms in all eqs. are negative and statistically significant; e.g., the
lagged EC term in eq. (1) suggests that a 10 percent deviation during the current period from
long run FDI flows to Chile is corrected by about 1.3 percent in the next year on average.
Finally, stability tests were conducted to determine whether the null hypothesis of no
structural break could be rejected for key periods in Chile’s history. The Chow breakpoint
tests suggested that the null hypothesis could not be rejected for the crises years 1973 (F-stat:
1.373; p-value: 0.265), 1975 (F-stat: 1.63; p-value: 0.186), and 1982 (F-stat; 1.306; p-value:
0.291).
Before concluding, the EC models were used to track the historical data on the percentage
growth rate in inward FDI flows to Chile during the period under review. Figure 4 below,
corresponding to equation (2) in Table 2, shows that, on average, the model was able to track
the turning points in the actual series relatively well. D(LKDI) refers to the actual series and
D(LKDIF) denotes the in-sample forecast. In addition, Figure 5 below shows that the Theil
inequality coefficient for this model is 0.156, which is well below the threshold value of 0.3,
and suggests that the predictive power of the model is quite good (see Theil, 1966). The Theil
coefficients can be decomposed into three major components: the bias, variance, and
covariance terms. Ideally, the bias and variance components should equal zero, while the
covariance proportion should equal one. The estimates reported in Figure 2 suggest that all of
these ratios are close to their optimum values (bias= 0.00, variance= 0.13, and covariance =
0.87). Sensitivity analysis on the coefficients also revealed that changes in the initial or
ending period did not alter the predictive power of the selected models.
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Forecast: D(LKDIF)
Actual: D(LKDI)
Forecast sample: 1960 2014
Adjusted sample: 1965 2014
Included observations: 50
Root Mean Squared Error 0.038887
Mean Absolute Error
0.030084
Mean Abs. Percent Error 54.29478
Theil Inequality Coefficient 0.156203
Bias Proportion
0.000000
Variance Proportion
0.131808
Covariance Proportion 0.868192
Theil U2 Coefficient
0.381507
Symmetric MAPE
46.35474

Figure 5. Theil Inequality Statistics, 1960-2014
5. Conclusion
Several major findings were presented in this paper. First, the evidence for Chile suggests that
gross and net FDI flows have been substantial during the decade of the nineties and the first
two decades of the 21st century, particularly in relation to GDP and gross fixed domestic
capital formation. However, once profit and dividend remittances are deducted from gross or
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net FDI inflows, the contribution of FDI to the financing of capital formation, although
increasing in most years, is far less than advertised--and for some recent years, it has, in fact,
diverted resources away from the financing of capital formation; that is, the outflow of profits
has exceeded the net inflow of FDI.
Second, the econometric results suggest that market size (proxied by real GDP), the real
exchange rate, the debt-service ratio, the human capital variable, and the physical
infrastructure variable had their anticipated signs and were statistically and economically
significant in explaining the variation of FDI flows to Chile over the 1960-2014 period. In
addition the institutional variables, captured by the included dummy variables and the
economic freedom index (EFI) reported by the Fraser Institute, had their expected effects and
were statistically significant. In particular, the interactive dummy term suggests that
institutional reforms have enhanced the effect of traditional variables such as real GDP in
attracting FDI flows to the nation. The results for the EFI variable, however, should be
interpreted with care given the paucity of the data for the index and its high degree of
collinearity with some of the included regressors.
Third, the Johansen cointegration test indicated that there is a stable relationship among the
relevant variables which keeps them in proportion to one another over the long run. This is a
highly important contribution to the extant literature because previous econometric studies
relating to Chile have failed to determine whether the estimated relationships were spurious
or not. Finally, the EC models reported in Table 2 suggests that short-run deviations from the
long-run FDI relationship are corrected in subsequent periods and, equally as important,
Figure 4 shows that the in-sample forecasts of the EC models are able to track the turning
points in the data relatively well.
From a research and policy standpoint, it would be highly important for future investigators
to determine whether the massive inflows of FDI the country has received in recent years
have been directed away from traditional (mining and agricultural) sectors and towards
Agreenfield sectors (IT, renewable energy, and industrial machinery), where positive direct
and indirect effects in the form of intangiblessuch as the transfer of technology and
managerial knowhow are likely to be present. If econometric evidence shows that FDI
inflows directed to these sectors have had a positive and economically significant effect on
labor productivity growth, then it may help offset the short-term costs associated with
generous subsidies, tax concessions, and pressures on the balance of payments as a result of
the substantial growth in TNCs= remittances of profits and dividends from the country in
recent years. The estimates also suggest that FDI flows will be attracted, on a long-term basis,
to developing countries such as Chile provided that policy makers avoid sharp depreciations
of the real exchange rate that lower the real (dollar) rate of return on FDI investments, and
implement policies that ensure the availability of a well-educated citizenry, adequate physical
infrastructure, and the rule of law.
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Notes
Note 1. FDI flows channeled through both Chapter XIX and DL 600 during the 1987-95
period were primarily confined to the mining sector and traditional industries such as textiles,
leather, and footwear where the country=s has a comparative advantage based on low unit
labor costs and natural resources. However, during the 1996-2002 period there was a marked
decline in the proportion of FDI channeled to the mining sector and a concomitant increase in
the share allocated to so-called Agreenfield sectors such as telecommunications,
manufacturing, renewable energy, and financial and business services (see Alatorre and Razo,
2010; and ECLAC, 2007). This trend has also been accompanied by a change in the
geographic origin of capital flows away from United States and Canadian firms and towards
European (particularly Spanish) companies in the service (finance and telecommunications)
sector.
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Note 2. Agosin (1995, pp. 121-122) estimates a simple regression model that tries to explain
the variation in FDI flows to Chile during the 1975-93 period. He finds that both the level of
real GDP in constant dollars and the real depreciation of the exchange have a positive and
statistically significant effect on FDI flows. He also includes a dummy variable to capture the
adoption of the debt conversion program (Chapter XIX), and finds that it also has a positive
and statistically significant impact on FDI flows. The major problem with this otherwise
interesting paper is that the author does not undertake a cointegration analysis of the FDI
investment relationship. Given the likely presence of unit roots in the level data, the reported
estimates are not reliable.
Note 3. It would be preferable to use a more direct measure of costs such as unitary labor
costs. Unfortunately, data on Chilean unit labor costs for the period under review (going as
far back as the sixties and early seventies) is not available in a consistent and reliable form.
Note 4. It is important not to confuse economic freedom with political and civil liberties.
Countries may confer upon their citizens a substantial amount of political and civil liberty in
the form of fair and competitive elections and freedom of the press, but still pursue policies
that are inimical to economic freedom such as high levels of taxation and excessive
government intervention and regulation.
Note 5. There are no initial estimates for the foreign capital stock in Chile in 1960 or, for that
matter, its rate of depreciation. This study constructed the stock of foreign capital in Chile
based on the assumption that its general trend does not differ significantly from that of the
country=s total fixed private capital stock. The capital growth rate and depreciation estimates
were obtained from Hoffman (2000, Appendix H, p. 277). The initial private capital stock is
constructed on an assumed private capital stock growth rate of 3 percent (equal to the growth
rate of GDP in 1940-60) and the following estimates for depreciation: 2.5 percent for
construction (40 years of service life) and 7 percent for machinery and equipment (14 years).
In view of the fact that there are no disaggregated data on the composition of foreign capital
flows to Chile for the period under review (viz., structures vs. machinery and equipment), this
study used a 5 percent depreciation rate (20 years of service life). The latter figure is the same
as that used by ECLAC (1998) in its computation of capital stocks for several major Latin
American nations (including Chile, see Technical Note 2, pp. 162-165). In fact, ECLAC
argues that the higher rate of depreciation is more appropriate in view of the faster
obsolescence rate for machinery and equipment with a high technological content. For
example, ECLAC reports that at the beginning of the 1990s computers and related equipment
were depreciated in 5 years, yet by the end of the decade, they were depreciated in just two
years (p. 163). Finally, Hoffman reports that the capital-output ratio for Chile was quite
stable for the 1950-60 period, averaging 2.74, and for the 1957-60 period used in this study, it
was unchanged at 2.7 (for further details, see Appendix H, pp. 276-278). To ensure the
robustness of the econometric results, other estimates of the rate of depreciation were used (1
and 10 percent), as well as different estimates of the initial foreign capital stock (e.g.,
summing over 3 and 5 years), but the results were not altered significantly.
Note 6. Unit root tests under the assumption of a deterministic trend also indicated that in
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level form the variables were non-stationary. Thus, the common practice of de-trending the
data would not render them stationary (results are available upon written request).
Note 7. The ECM model was also estimated with the growth rate in the percentage of paved
roads and the results indicated that a ceteris paribus increase in the growth rate in the
percentage of paved roads by 10 percent generates a 3.5 percent increase in FDI inflows
(t-stat=2.00, p-value=.052).
Note 8. The length of the lags is likely to change as the legal-institutional environment for
conducting business in Chile improves. In this scenario, the flow of FDI to Chile is likely to
become more responsive to any future changes in GDP and/or the real exchange rate, ceteris
paribus.
Note 9. EFI was also highly correlated with the LGDP variable (0.81).
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